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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JLLlAM CHESS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
-v· 
l)\.JRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
~·tah State Prison, 
Case No. 16085 
Respondent-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of an action filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court in a habeas corpus petition in which the appellant 
sought release from custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison 
' bv reason of the commitment issued by the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Weber County in Criminal No. 12095-A. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant's petition came on for hearing on Thursday, 
August 17, 1978, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya who heard 
testimony and reviewed the trial transcript and ordered that the 
relief sought in the complaint for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the order of the Third 
District Court and an order of this Court granting him release from 
the commitment or a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant was tried on December 16 and 17, 1976, 
before the Second Judicial District Court on a charge of Aggravated ;'J 
Robbery, a First Degree Felony. The appellant was one of two co- :r 
defendants in the case, each charged with being an accomplice. 
The 
person who admitted to robbing the gas station, Ray Shearer, was 
not on trial because of a previous plea of guilty to a reduced 
offense (T. 55). He was called at the trial, but did not implicate 
the appellant or the co-defendant. 
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the 
State, included the fact that the appellant and the co-defendant 
merely pulled into a gas station in a vehicle (T. 43). The two 
persons in the car that pulled into the gas station did not get 
out of the car and left after a purchase of gasoline. The State's 
theory at trial rested upon the fact that the appellant was identi· 
fied at or near the time Raymond Shearer entered the situation, 
The appellant was found guilty and later sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison. 
At the hearing held before the Court in the habeas corpus 
proceeding the appellant testified that he appeared in jail clothes 
at the trial held on December 16 and 17, 1976, in the Second Judicia: 
District Court. He stated that he requested to appear otherwise, 
but was told by his counsel that it was tood late to make any 
arrangements for other clothes. 
He also stated that he did not appeal his conviction 
- 2 -
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1e 
ia: 
: 3sed upon the fact that he received a letter which represented 
:'.at if he was awarded a new trial, he may be found guilty and 
J~ished for a greater offense than the prison sentence he is 
~esently serving for the conviction. A copy of that letter was 
~traduced in evidence. 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION AS THE RESULT OF THE REPRESENTATION CONTAINED 
IN THE LETTER OF HIS APPOINTED COUNSEL. 
An abridgment of the appellant's right to appeal his 
conviction is incompatible with his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Chapman 
v. United States, 469 F. 2d 634 (C .A. Ga. 1972). When the state 
procedure provides for an appellate review, the appeal afforded to 
a defendant must comport with due process of the law. Borrough v. 
~· 497 F.2d 1007 (CA. Tex. 1974). 
In Levine v. Peyton, 444 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1971), the 
Federal Court of Appeals held that due process requires that the 
defendant be freed of the apprehension of receiving a harsher 
sentence after the re-trial of his case and that the Due Process 
Clause forbids harsher sentences after re-trial. This rule has 
also been applied continually by the state courts which also prohibit 
the courts from giving greater sentences upon re-trial than were 
originally meted out by the trial court. State v. Castro, 554 P.2d 
914 (Ariz. App. 1976) and State v. Gantt, 492 P.2d 1199 (Ariz. 1972). 
- 3 -
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In the present case, but for the improper represent t· 
a lons 
of appointed counsel set forth in the correspondence introduced . 
1n 
evidence, the appellant would have pursued his statutory right to 
appeal. At the hearing, the appellant testified that b t f 
u or these 
representations he would have pursued his appeal. If awarded a new 
trial, the Fourteenth Amendment would have prevented the trial cour: 
from imposing upon the appellant a greater punishment than he is 
presently receiving and he would have been entitled to credit f~ 
time served. Because of the representations of his appointed 
counsel, the appellant was therefore denied his right to appeal 
and therefore he is being unjustly and unlawfully restrained of 
his liberty. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW BECAUSE HE APPEARED BEFORE THE JURY DRESSED 
IN IDENTIFIABLE PRISON CLOTHES. 
In the case of Estelle v. Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976), 
the United States Supreme Court held that a state cannot, consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial be· 
fore a jury dressed in prison clothes. The Court also found that 
the trial judge had no duty to inquire of the defendant as to whether 
he was going intentionally to trial in prison clothes. 
However, in this case, the appellant actually made a 
request to his appointed counsel and therefore the case of Estelle 
· h bl The wa1."ver of the appellant's con· v. Williams is distingu1.s a e. 
- 4 - 1 
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,:i~utional right was not the type of personal, knowing waiver 
;s '..las contemplated by the Estelle decision, 
POINT III 
BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHICH EXISTED 
BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATION OF THE APPELLANT BY 
HIS COUNSEL AND THE KEY WITNESS FOR THE STATE AND 
THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY OBJECT DURING THE TRIAL 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND EFFECT-
IVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
At the appellant's trial, the State called Raymond Shearer, 
the self-confessed perpetrator of the robbery of the gas station 
,,hich the appellant was also charged as an accomplice (T. 55). 
The record reveals that the witness called by the State was repre-
• sented by the attorney who was defending the appellant in the case 
before the Court (T. 57). 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee an 
accused the right to counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U,S. 335 (1963). It is well settled that one lawyer may represent 
lt more than one defendant so long as his representation is effective. 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). However, effective assistance 
of counsel contemplates that such assistance be "untrammeled and 
1er unimpaired by . . . requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously 
represent conflicting interests." Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60, 70 (1942). 
The danger implicit in dual representation is that an 
attorney who undertakes such a task finds himself simultaneously 
- 5 -
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The 
balancing the interests of each defendant against the other. 
problem is aggravated by the fact that an attorney can rarely 
predict when a conflict of interest will or will not arise. 
There are too many unknown variables in a criminal trial for an 
attorney to presume to know whether the int~rests of one client 
will conflict with another. 
Since Glasser v. United States, supra, the Supreme Coun 
has only recently re-examined the issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel due to conflicts of interest. In Holloway v. Arkansas 
_, 
U.S. (1978), 23 Cr. L. 3001, three co-defendants were 
jointly represented by a court appointed lawyer. 
The Supreme Court held that ~e failure to either appoint 
separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether 
the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel, in the face 
of the representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again 
before the jury was empane lled, deprived petitioners of the guaranti, 
of assistance of counsel. In reaching this result, the Court statec 
that: 
In the normal case where a harmless error rule 
is applied, the error occurs at trial and its 
scope is readily identifiable . . . Bit in a 
case of joint representation of conflicting 
interests the evil - it bears repeating - is 
in what the advocate finds himself compelled 
to refrain from doing ... Thus, an inquiry, 
into a claim of harmless error here would re-
quire, unlike most cases, unguided speculation. 
23 Cr. L. at 3005. 
- 6 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rt 
~I 
~us. the Hollowav court concluded that because of the masked 
:.acure of such an error, requiring a defendant to show any amount 
!i prejudice would be too much. 
The plaintiff submits that where no on-the-record waiver 
of his right to conflict-free counsel appears (R. l-4), the burden 
shifts to the State to prove either that no conflict existed, or 
to prove that the conflict did not impair his representation at 
trial. The importance of the right to counsel has sparked courts 
to formulate a prophylactic rule to insure his protection of the 
important right to counsel. 
In United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d l (lst Cir., 1974), 
int a drug defendant challenged his conviction where his attorney had 
a in 
also represented his co-defendant. In rejecting this claim, the 
Court found that there was no divergence in the interests of the co-
defendants. Although the First Circuit held that dual representa-
tion had not adversely affected the defendant in that case, the anti, 
a tee Court went on to announce a rule that the lack of a satisfactory 
judicial inquiry into dual representation shifts the burden of 
proof on the question of prejudice to the government. In such a 
situation, the government is required to demonstrate from the record 
the unlikelihood of prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In stating this rule, the Court specifically recognized the 
difficulties associated with an after-the-fact reconstruction of 
prejudice. See also, State v. Olsen, 258 tLW. 2d 898. (Minn., 1977). 
In the present case, the trial court made no inquiry as 
- 7 -
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to problems raised by the dual representation by appellant's 
counsel. Furthermore, the appellant was prejudiced when this 
entire matter was brought to the jury's attention during the tri~ 
(R. 58). Therefore, the appellant submits that he is entitled to 
either a new trial or release from custody because of the dual 
n~ 
resentation and conflict of interest and the denial of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
In addition, the appellant asserts that he was also 
denied effective assistance of counsel because of his attorney's 
failure to properly object to the testimony introduced at trial 
or to raise this matter prior to trail. The confict should have 
been resolved prior to trial to avoid the prejudice that resulted 
to the appellant. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS A RESULT 
OF THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS THAT OCCURRED AT THE 
TRIAL AND HE SHOULD THEREFORE BE AWARDED A NEW 
TRIAL A!ID THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
In State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah, 1955), the 
Supreme Court held that a combination of errors which when singu· 
larly considered might be thought insufficient to warrant a re-
versal, may when considered as to the cumulative effect call for 
reversal. 
In the appellant's case, the circumstantial evidence at 
best would indicate that the appellant merely pulled into a gas 
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il 
:p. 
.t 
;:J::ion in a car and then left the station. The State alleged 
0ac this was part of a plan to rob the gas station by distracting 
:'le attention of the attendant. However, the principal to the 
Jffense denied that the appellant was involved and the evidence 
introduced does not support the State's contention. 
The appellant submits the trial court erred in allowing 
:he statements made by the palintiff after the robbery into evidence 
·;ithout any showing of the Miranda Warning (T. 35) . Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965). The officer taking the statements 
:::---
stated that he considered Mr. Chess a suspect when he was taken 
do~ to the police headquarters for interrogation (T. 46). The 
"request" to go down to the station occurred right after the 
officers had conducted a search of both the premises and the 
vehicle parked in front of the premises at which the appellant was 
staying (T. 44) . 
During the examination of the owner of the gas station, 
the prosecutor asked a series of leading questions designed to 
elicit conclusions which the witness did not have the ability to 
draw from his personal observations (Line 12 to line 22, T. 33). 
This testimony was extremely prejudiced because the State had 
to rely upon circumstantial evidence to elicit certain assumptions 
about the state of mind of the appellant whose actions standing 
alone were entirely innocent. This line of questioning violated 
Rules 19 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence . 
There also exists a substantial question as to whether 
- 9 -
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the search of the appellant's premises · · 
was constltUtlonal under 
the parameters of the Fourth Amendment to h u · d t e nlte States Con . 
s tt. 
tution. At page 44 of the transcript one of the officers sear~· 
tn1 
the premises stated: 
This 
the 
I asked the young man--both of them were very 
nervous--at this time if I may search their 
premises for a white male involved. They told 
me they didn't know of a white male; they didn't 
have a friend, and hadn't seen one. 
I looked through their apartment anyway. Going 
through their apartment I found another holster 
for a long barreled revolver or pistol. I asked 
them about this, and they didn't know anything 
about it. (T. 44). 
testimony is in contradiction to the earlier testimony 
search was based upon the consent of the appellant. 
Finally, the State called the head jailer of the 
County Jail (T. 103). He testified that the appellant and 
that 
Weber 
the 
co-defendant, Herbert White, were inmates at the jail and were 
housed in the same area as the witness, Steve Shearer (T. lOS). 
This evidence was extremely unduly prejudicial and was not relevant 
to any issue in the trial. Utah Rules of Evidence 45. As pointed 
out in Point I of this brief, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prevents the unnecessary interjection of the 
fact of the appellant's incarceration. The error of introducing 
this testimony magnified by the fact that the testimony was not 
relevant to prove any material issue in the case. The error was 
further compounded by the improper comment of the prosecution con· 
cerning this evidence (T. 228). 
- 10 -
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It 
In light of the circumstantial and in-direct evidence 
,,: the guilt of the appellant at trial, the cumulative effect of 
:r.e evidentiary errors is magnified. The theory of accomplice 
:orallY is stretched past the limit in the present case. The 
evidence introduced concerning the actual events surrounding the 
robbery show no overt act or indication that the two persons in 
the car at the gas station were knowingly participating in the 
robbery committed in fact by Raymond Shearer. 
The appellant respectfully submits that a review by 
the Court of the evidence introduced, the trial court should not 
have permitted this matter to hav~ been submitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the appellant submits that in light of the 
improper evidence introduced at trial coupled with the errors set 
forth in Points I, II, and III of this brief, the appellant was 
denied a fair trial and this Court should award the appellant a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM CHESS 
Pro Se 
RANDALL GAITHER 
- 11 -
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